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Three times per second, our eyes make a new ﬁxation that generates a new bottom-up
analysis in the visual system. How much is extracted from each glimpse? For how long and
in what form is that information remembered? To answer these questions, investigators
have mimicked the effect of continual shifts of ﬁxation by using rapid serial visual presen-
tation of sequences of unrelated pictures. Experiments in which viewers detect speciﬁed
target pictures show that detection on the basis of meaning is possible at presentation
durations as brief as 13ms, suggesting that understanding may be based on feedforward
processing, without feedback. In contrast, memory for what was just seen is poor unless
the viewer has about 500ms to think about the scene: the scene does not need to remain in
view. Initial memory loss after brief presentations occurs over several seconds, suggesting
that at least some of the information from the previous few ﬁxations persists long enough
to support a coherent representation of the current environment. In contrast to marked
memory loss shortly after brief presentations, memory for pictures viewed for 1 s or more
is excellent. Although some speciﬁc visual information persists, the form and content of
the perceptual and memory representations of pictures over time indicate that concep-
tual information is extracted early and determines most of what remains in longer-term
memory.
Keywords: picture perception, rapid serial visual presentation, picture memory, detection, feedforward processing,
masking, search
INTRODUCTION
THE PROBLEM
We make three or four eye ﬁxations each second, all day long.
That suggests that 250 ms is long enough to identify most objects,
but is it enough to recognize a whole scene? How much do we
remember about each ﬁxation and for how long? To develop
and maintain information about the environment, we need some
form of visual memory that spans several ﬁxations. But, carry-
over from the preceding ﬁxation lacks detail (e.g., Irwin, 1992;
Irwin and Andrews, 1996; Henderson and Hollingworth, 1999).
Indeed, we overlook major changes in a scene if the scene is
interrupted for as little as 80 ms – the phenomena of change
blindness (e.g., Rensink et al., 1997, 2000) and boundary exten-
sion (Intraub and Richardson, 1989). We are not blind, however,
to changes that affect gist or changes to objects that we are
attending or are about to ﬁxate. Thus, the information that we
carry over from a ﬁxation seems to be limited and to be mean-
ingful rather than purely visual. Our memory for pictures is
poor, however, for unrelated pictures presented in a continuous
sequence at rates in the range of eye ﬁxations (Potter and Levy,
1969).
On the other hand, we have good long-term memory for
pictures viewed for 1 or 2 s (Nickerson, 1965; Shepard, 1967;
Potter and Levy, 1969; Standing, 1973) and we can remem-
ber them in considerable detail, whether they represent sin-
gle objects (Brady et al., 2008) or more complex scenes (Kon-
kle et al., 2010). Some highly distinctive information must
be retained from pictures that we have viewed for a few
seconds.
HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE TO UNDERSTAND A VISUAL OBJECT OR
SCENE?
There is no simple answer to this question: the answer depends on
what one’s criterion for understanding is. One could measure the
time it takes to name the picture, but even for objects with well-
known names, the naming time of about 900 ms includes search
for the word after one has already recognized what the object is.
Another measure of understanding is the time to decide whether
the scene or object matches some description, such as “animal.”
This category detection task turns out to be considerably faster
(around 600 ms) than the time to name a picture (Potter and
Faulconer, 1975), but still includes the time to generate the yes or
no response. A still faster response is the time between the onset
of a pair of pictures and the initiation of an eye movement to (for
example) the picture of an animal or a face (e.g., Kirchner and
Thorpe, 2006; Crouzet et al., 2010): this selective decision can take
as little as 100 ms. All the measures just discussed include the time
for the information to pass from the retina to the visual cortex as
well as decision and response processes that occur after identiﬁ-
cation (e.g., Potter, 1983). Still shorter times can be obtained by
using measures of brain responses such as event related potentials
(ERPs) that do not include any overt response.
Single masked stimuli
A different approach is to control the time available for process-
ing a stimulus such as a picture, and to measure the minimum
presentation time required for successful identiﬁcation. However,
because of visual persistence (continued activation in the visual
system after a stimulus ends), the duration of the physical stimulus
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is not closely related to the effective duration of the stimulus: for
example, a picture presented for only 20 ms followed by a blank
screen may be as readily processed as one shown for 100 ms. A
common method to solve that problem is to use a backward mask
such as a patterned stimulus that follows the picture. Such a mask
is thought to interrupt processing of the picture. If that is the case,
then by varying the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the
onset of the target and that of the mask, a minimal processing
time required for identiﬁcation can be determined. For example,
when a single picture is presented, followed by a visual mask (such
as a collage of colored paper cut into small circles and irregular
shapes), it is possible to remember as many as half the pictures
with a duration as short as 50 ms, and 80% are remembered at a
duration of 120 ms (Potter, 1976; see Figure 3, discussed below).
A continuing problem with the logic of the masking proce-
dure, however, is that the neural basis for the effect is not well-
understood: does the masked stimulus continue to be processed,
perhaps unconsciously, after the mask appears, or does processing
instantly stop? This question is especially relevant to feedforward
models, discussed below. Moreover, a backward mask does not
necessarily interrupt all processing – and the amount of inter-
ference is a complex function of the visual relation between the
target and mask, the semantic (conceptual) relation, and the SOA
between target and mask. (For a more complete account of the
complexities of backward and forward masking, see Eriksen and
Eriksen, 1971, and Breitmeyer and Ogmen, 2006.) With very
short SOAs, the visual relation may be a stronger determinant
of the effectiveness of the mask than the conceptual relation, but
as the SOA increases, the reverse may be the case (e.g., Potter,
1976; Loftus and Ginn, 1984). Indeed, the most important factor
may be whether the following mask is itself a stimulus that the
viewer needs to attend to and report on: see rapid serial visual
presentation (RSVP) below and the discussion of visual versus
conceptual masking. I return to the question of masking in Section
“Detecting Pictures at Ultra-High Rates: Evidence for Feedforward
Processing?”
Perception of objects in settings
A further question is whether knowledge of co-occurrences
between objects and settings inﬂuences the initial perception of
a scene, or whether (as suggested by Hollingworth and Hender-
son, 1998, 1999) objects and settings in a given picture are ﬁrst
understood independently and only later merged. In one set of
studies (Davenport and Potter, 2004), pictured objects such as a
football player or a priest were superimposed, either congruently
or incongruently, on background settings such as a football ﬁeld or
the interior of a cathedral (Figure 1). The pictures were presented
for 80 ms, with a backward noise mask, and the participant was
instructed to report the foreground object, the background set-
ting, or both. In each case performancewas better in the congruent
than the incongruent condition, suggesting that objects and back-
ground are processed interactively, early in processing. In a further
study (Davenport, 2007) one or two objects were presented on a
background. The relation between the two objects (whether they
would be likely to be present in the same scene or not) had an effect
on report that was additive with the effect of congruency with the
background: that is, the relationship between the two objects, as
FIGURE 1 | Examples of consistent scenes (top row) and inconsistent
scenes (bottom row). In all cases, the central ﬁgure or object was
photoshopped onto the background picture. Participants viewed only one of
the versions of a given picture, and reported either the central object, the
background setting, or both. From Davenport and Potter (2004).
well as each of the objects’ relation to the background, inﬂuenced
report of the objects. Joubert et al. (2007, 2008) carried out similar
studies, ﬁnding that objects in congruent contexts were responded
to faster than in incongruous contexts.
RAPID SERIAL VISUAL PRESENTATION
In studies using backward masking of pictures, each trial con-
sists of a single picture and a mask. In normal vision, however,
the eyes make a continuous sequence of ﬁxations. What happens
when pictures are presented in a continuous stream at durations
in the range of eye ﬁxations, and participants try to remember all
of them? To investigate this question, Potter and Levy (1969) used
RSVP (Forster, 1970) to show participants sequences of 16 unre-
lated pictures (Figure 2). They varied the presentation duration
between 125 and 2000 ms. To test recognition memory following
the presentation, the pictures were presented one at a time inter-
mixed with 16 new pictures (distractors). Participants responded
Yes,Maybe, or No. Figure 3 shows the proportion of yes responses,
corrected for guessing1. Clearly, 250 ms was not enough time to
assure memory of a picture a few minutes later, as only about
half the pictures presented for that duration were correctly recog-
nized. With a presentation of 2 s, more than 90% of the pictures
were remembered, consistent with studies showing that long-term
memory for pictures viewed for a few seconds is excellent (Nick-
erson, 1965; Shepard, 1967; Standing, 1973; Brady et al., 2008).
Thus, even though a single masked picture may be reported cor-
rectly after it is viewed for as little as 50 ms, as shown in the
left-hand function in Figure 3 (Potter, 1976), it takes considerably
longer to process pictures to the same level when they are pre-
sented in a continuous stream in which all the pictures are to be
attended.
1A one-high-threshold formula was used to correct for guessing, Pcorr = [P(TY)−
P(FY)]/[1− P(FY)],where TY is a correct yes response and FY is a false yes response.
This guessing correction is used in all data ﬁgures.
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FIGURE 2 | An illustration of an RSVP sequence of pictures.
FIGURE 3 | Proportion of pictures recognized following single masked
presentations (solid curve, Potter, 1976, Exp. 3) and proportion
recognized after RSVP (dashed curves, two groups with different
ranges of presentation durations; Potter and Levy, 1969). Data are
corrected for guessing (see text footnote 1). Figure from Potter, 1976.
VISUAL VERSUS CONCEPTUAL MASKING
What makes an RSVP sequence hard to remember is not the brief-
ness of the pictures, but the fact that each picture is immediately
followed by another. With a single masked picture, the viewer can
continue to process the information after the mask appears; evi-
dently that is not possible with a continuous sequence in which
all the pictures need to be attended. In a study by Intraub (1980)
pictures were presented for 110 ms in an RSVP sequence, and only
20% were remembered later, whereas when a blank interstimulus
interval (ISI) was added after each picture, the percent remem-
bered increased steadily as the ISI increased, to 84% with an ISI of
1390 ms: this result shows that a viewer can voluntarily continue to
process and code intomemory a brief picture after it is no longer in
view. Similarly, a study showed that pictures presented for 173 ms
in anRSVP sequencewere poorly remembered; if a blankof 827 ms
was added after each picture, memory was almost as good as if the
pictures were each shown for 1000 ms (Potter et al., 2004).
Once the SOA between the picture and the following visual
mask is about 100 ms, memory depends little on the actual dura-
tion of presentation, but instead on the total uninterrupted time
the viewer has to continue to think about the picture. Thus, if
a viewer is shown a sequence of pictures that alternate between
a short duration of 112 ms and a long duration of 1500 ms, the
instruction to attend only to the brief pictures results in mem-
ory for about 63% of the brief pictures and only 54% of the long
pictures: intention to continue processing the brief pictures actu-
ally leads to better memory than for the long-duration pictures
(Intraub, 1984). These results show that there is a distinction
between visual and conceptual masking: visual masking occurs
primarily with short SOAs (under 100 ms), whereas conceptual
masking (due to attention to a following stimulus) occurs with
SOAs up to 500 ms or more (Potter, 1976; see also Intraub, 1980,
1981; Loftus and Ginn, 1984; Loftus et al., 1988).
DETECTING PICTURES
Given the poor memory for pictures presented at durations in the
range of eye ﬁxations, does it take longer than a single ﬁxation to
understand a novel scene? Do we even momentarily understand
pictures shown for only 250 ms in an RSVP sequence? Intuitively,
we may think that if we had understood what a picture was about,
we would surely remember it for at least a few minutes. Perhaps
viewers fail to remember brieﬂy presented pictures because they
did not comprehend them in a single glimpse, whereas normally
they could continue to look at something until it is recognized.Yet,
when viewing pictures at a rate as high as 10/s, one’s impression
is that each picture can be seen and understood momentarily: is
that an illusion? To address this question, participants were asked
to detect a target picture in an RSVP sequence that was named or
shown to them before the sequence (Potter, 1975, 1976). Detection
was surprisingly good with either kind of cue, even at durations as
short as 113 ms/picture (Figure 4). It is not surprising that show-
ing the actual picture in advance enabled viewers to detect it; the
surprise was that performance was almost as good when view-
ers had only a name that captured the picture’s conceptual gist.
Intraub (1979, 1980, 1981) showed that viewers could even detect
pictures described by a negative category – for example, they could
detect the only picture in a sequence that was not an animal and
could report the identity of the non-animal picture, showing that
they had understood it.
Further evidence that a picture’s identity can be retrieved
quickly is shown in a detection study (Potter et al., 2010) in
which participants looked for two instances of pictures in a spec-
iﬁed category such as “dinner food” or “bird,” and had to report
the speciﬁc identity of each instance (e.g., swan and eagle). As
shown in Figure 5, the presentation duration was 107 ms. Partic-
ipants were able to do this successfully even when the two targets
were presented in immediate succession, although they showed
an attentional blink for the second target when the SOA between
targets was 213 ms, an effect typically observed in search tasks.
Detection and memory when multiple pictures are presented
simultaneously
Viewers can process serially presented pictures remarkably
rapidly, but can they process two or more pictures presented
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FIGURE 4 | Detection of a target picture in an RSVP sequence of 16
pictures, given a picture of the target or a name for the target, as a
function of the presentation time per picture. Also shown is later
recognition performance in a group that simply viewed the sequence, and
then was tested for recognition. Results are corrected for guessing (see
text footnote 1). From Potter (1976).
FIGURE 5 | An example of an RSVP sequence in a search experiment in
which participants reported the specific names of two exemplars of
the search category. Here the exemplars are hamburger and spaghetti.
From Potter et al. (2010).
simultaneously? When the task is to detect a speciﬁed target, the
results suggest that detection is relatively successful with up to
four simultaneous pictures, in RSVP streams consisting of eight
successive four-item arrays (Potter and Fox, 2009). Each array was
a combination of none to four pictures, with texture masks in the
non-picture locations. The RSVP sequence was presented at 240,
400,or 720 ms per array.Although accuracy decreased a little as the
number of pictures in an array increased, detection was generally
good: even at 240 ms per array with four simultaneous pictures,
59% of the targets were detected, with 9% false yeses (cf. Rous-
selet et al., 2002, 2004a,b). In contrast, when viewers simply tried
to remember the pictures, performance was much lower overall,
particularly when there was more than one picture in the array.
Rapid memory loss for pictures seen brieﬂy in RSVP: serial position
effects in memory testing
People can understand pictures presented brieﬂy, but forget most
of them a few minutes later. When the recognition test begins
immediately, the ﬁrst one or two pictures tested are likely to be
remembered well, but there is rapid loss over the next several sec-
onds of testing (Potter et al., 2002, 2004; Endress and Potter, in
press): that is, there is a strong serial position effect in the memory
test. A related question is the effect of serial position in presenta-
tion. If information is being lost as more pictures are presented
(either because of retroactive interference or because of the pas-
sage of time), we would expect a recency effect. (Note, however,
that the ﬁnal picture is not tested in these experiments as it is not
masked.) Potter et al. (2002) found no evidence of a recency effect,
even with sequences of 10 or 20 pictures. Increasing the memory
set size did decrease the extra beneﬁt of early testing somewhat,
but not by causing selective forgetting of pictures early in the
list.
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THIS SHORT-LASTING MEMORY FOR
PICTURES?
The time course of forgetting after viewing an RSVP sequence of
pictures contrasts with that of change blindness, the apparently
immediate loss of detailed information about a single picture,
once it is no longer in view. Change blindness is the inability
of viewers to detect a change in one feature of a picture, and it
has been observed when a blank interval as short as 80 ms inter-
venes between the initial and changed versions; at longer intervals,
the problem is even more acute (see Rensink et al., 1997; Simons
and Levin, 1997). Imposing a short blank between views is neces-
sary to obscure the transient that would mark the location of the
change if there were no interval. Change blindness suggests that
those details were not perceived in the ﬁrst place, or that many
speciﬁcs of a picture are lost immediately, or that the next picture
updates the similar preceding picture without leaving a record
of the changed details. Change blindness is, however, a very dif-
ferent phenomenon than the forgetting observed after an RSVP
sequence. Whereas on a change blindness trial there is no question
that the picture remains the same in most respects and is thus seen
as the same picture, in the RSVP experiments considered here the
question is whether a given test picture is familiar at all. Thus,
change blindness studies assess the level of detail in immediate
memory for a picture, whereas here we are interested in the per-
sistence of a representation sufﬁcient to make the picture seem
familiar when presented again among dissimilar pictures.
Could the short-lasting memory for pictures be iconic mem-
ory (e.g., Sperling, 1960) or very short-term memory (VSTM) as
described by Phillips and his colleagues (Phillips, 1983; Potter and
Jiang, 2009)? The answer is no. Iconic memory is a very brief form
of relatively literal perceptual memory (although see Coltheart,
1983, for a somewhat different characterization), but it cannot
account for the ﬂeeting picture memory found with an immediate
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recognition test after an RSVP sequence, because iconic memory
is eliminated by noise masking and under photopic conditions
it lasts no longer than about 300 ms. VSTM is a form of short-
lasting visual memory observed in experiments such as those of
Phillips and Christie (1977), who presented viewers brieﬂy with a
4× 4 matrix in which an average of 8 random squares were white,
and then tested memory by presenting a second matrix that was
either identical to the preceding one or had one white cell added or
deleted. VSTM, unlike iconic memory, is capacity-limited, with an
estimated capacity of three or four items. In Phillips and Christie’s
study, the most recent matrix could be maintained for several
seconds in VSTM, provided that no other such matrices were pre-
sented in the interval and the participant continued to attend to
the remembered matrix. In contrast, in RSVP studies multiple
pictures are presented and one or more to-be-attended pictures
intervene between presentation and testing.
A likely contributor to short-term memory for pictures is con-
ceptual short-term memory (CSTM), a short-lasting memory
component proposed by Potter (1993, 1999, 2010) that represents
conceptual information about current stimuli, such as the mean-
ing of a picture, or meanings of words and sentences computed as
one reads or listens. The reasons for regarding this brief memory
representation as conceptual rather than (say) perceptual include
its apparent role in rapid selection between two words on the basis
of meaning, in relation to context (Potter et al., 1993, 1998), and
its putative role in sequential visual search tasks like those consid-
ered here in which the targets are deﬁned by meaning or category
rather than by physical form. During the brief time that informa-
tion about stimuli is in CSTM, associative links enable extraction
of whatever structure is present (such as sentence structure or the
gist of a picture) or allow the stimulus to be compared to a target
speciﬁcation, in a search task. Any momentarily active informa-
tion that does not become incorporated into such a structure (such
as the irrelevant meaning of an ambiguous word, or a non-target
picture) will be quickly forgotten.
Conceptual versus visual-perceptual memory
In relation to rapidly presented pictures, the CSTM claim is
that some pictures are adequately encoded and consolidated into
longer-termmemoryduring evenbrief viewing,but others are rep-
resented only in CSTM and are vulnerable to interference in the
ﬁrst few seconds after viewing. However, we do not know whether
the picture representation that persists for several seconds in the
studies we have reviewed here is sufﬁciently abstract to be con-
sidered conceptual rather than wholly or partly perceptual. Do
viewers remember only the picture’s conceptual content or gist, or
do they also remember visual features such as color, shape, and
layout? Work of Irwin and Andrews (1996), Gordon and Irwin
(2000), and Henderson (1997) suggests that this representation
of previous ﬁxations may be at least partially conceptual rather
than literal, inasmuch as viewers may not notice literal changes
that are conceptually consistent with the earlier ﬁxation. Ear-
lier work showed that the gist of a scene is understood quickly
even though the scene may then be forgotten (fairly) rapidly
(e.g., Potter, 1976; Intraub, 1980, 1981), which is consistent with
the assumption that conceptual information is abstracted rapidly.
Intraub (1981) showed, however, that viewers can remember some
speciﬁc pictorial information such as the colors and layout, along
with the gist.
The relative roles of such speciﬁc pictorial information and
more abstract conceptual informationwere explored inPotter et al.
(2004). They contrasted a conceptual and a pictorial recognition
test of picture memory. In the pictorial test, participants made
yes–no decisions to the ﬁve pictures they had just seen (exclud-
ing the sixth ﬁnal picture), mixed with ﬁve new pictures. In the
conceptual test, they made yes–no decisions to descriptive verbal
titles of the pictures, mixed with titles of unseen pictures. The
rate of presentation was 173 ms/picture; the 10-item recognition
test after each trial took about 8 s. The assumption was that test
pictures provide both visual and conceptual information, whereas
titles provide only conceptual information. If the beneﬁt of imme-
diate testing is that viewers only brieﬂy preserve purely pictorial
information, then the title test should reduce the beneﬁt of early
testing, but should be fairly equivalent to the picture test later in
testing. That was just what they found, as shown in Figure 6. In a
more recent study (Endress and Potter, in press) the advantage of
testing recognition with pictures rather than titles was maintained
throughout the test, suggesting that some more detailed informa-
tion (perceptual or conceptual) beyond that captured by a title
does persist over the 8-s test, even though memory for both forms
of information continues to decline.
In a further test of the conceptual basis of memory, Potter
et al. (2004) included in the recognition test occasional pictures
that matched the title – the gist – of one of the old pictures.
They called such a picture a decoy. The decoy was visually dif-
ferent from the old picture it replaced: side by side, it was easy
to tell that the pictures were not the same. If viewers rely on a
conceptual or gist representation of the presented pictures, they
FIGURE 6 | Recognition test of five pictures shown in RSVP for
173ms/picture; the test used pictures or titles. Guessing-corrected
results (see text footnote 1) are shown as a function of relative position in
the recognition test, which included ﬁve new pictures (distractors). From
Potter et al. (2004).
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should make false yes responses more often to decoys than to new
distractors that are not conceptually similar to any of the pic-
tures they have just seen, and that was what happened. Overall,
participants recognized 52% of the old pictures, falsely recog-
nized 30% of the decoys, and falsely recognized 15% of the other
new pictures, showing some susceptibility to conceptual decoys.
On the other hand, had viewers remembered only the concep-
tual gist of the picture, equivalent to the information in a title,
they would have been as likely to “recognize” the decoys as to
recognize the correct picture, and clearly that was not the case.
Again, then, there is evidence that viewers can remember some
particulars of pictures, beyond the gist, even at high rates of
presentation.
SHORT-LASTING MEMORY: SUMMARY
In sum, initial memory for a glimpsed picture (seen for the equiv-
alent of a single ﬁxation) is fairly accurate, but declines markedly
over the ﬁrst few recognition tests (or across an unﬁlled delay
of 5 s). There is some evidence that the initial stronger memory
includes speciﬁcally visual information, whereas after a delay the
memory is primarily conceptual. That is, detailed visual infor-
mation about a picture is lost more rapidly than conceptual
information. Accurate visual information may be important for
maintaining and updating scene representations over ﬁxations,
but conceptual memory seems to be the basis for longer-term,
organized knowledge.
As stated earlier, unlike brieﬂy glimpsed pictures, memory for
pictures viewed for a second or more can be highly accurate, at
least when viewers are paying attention. Yet, as work reviewed
here shows, normal eye ﬁxations are too brief to guarantee good
memory. They are, however, long enough to make it highly likely
that the viewer will have understood what he or she saw, at least
momentarily, allowing the viewer to continue looking or to take
appropriate action. The rapid comprehension of the gist of a scene
suggests that scenes are initially perceived as wholes – like sin-
gle objects. Although the gist of pictured scenes can be extracted
rapidly, exactly how that is done remains unclear. Work of Oliva
and her collaborators has given us some ideas about how visual
properties such as layout, texture, color, and the like can enable
rapid categorization of natural scenes, street scenes, and interiors
(Oliva, 2005).
DETECTING PICTURES AT ULTRA-HIGH RATES: EVIDENCE
FOR FEEDFORWARD PROCESSING?
WHAT CONSTITUTES EVIDENCE FOR FEEDFORWARD PROCESSING?
It is widely assumed that under normal viewing conditions per-
ception results from a combination of feedforward and feedback
connections (Di Lollo et al., 2000; Enns and Di Lollo, 2000;
Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002). Feed-
back from higher to lower levels in the visual system takes time,
however. At presentation durations of about 50 ms or less with
masking, some have proposed that there would not be time for
feedback to arrive before the lower-level activity has been inter-
rupted by the mask, so that perception would be restricted to
the information in the forward pass of neural activity from the
retina through the visual system (Perrett et al., 1992; Thorpe
and Fabre-Thorpe, 2001; Hung et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2009). In
feedforward models of the visual system (Serre et al., 2007a,b)
units which process the stimulus are hierarchically arranged:
units representing small regions of space (receptive ﬁelds) in
the retina converge to represent larger and larger receptive ﬁelds
and more abstract information along a series of pathways from
V1 to inferotemporal cortex (IT) and further on to prefrontal
cortex (PFC). Visual experience tunes this hierarchical struc-
ture, which acts as a ﬁlter that permits recognition of a huge
range of objects and scenes in a single forward pass of pro-
cessing. Yet, there is little direct evidence that the feedforward
process is able to identify objects and scenes accurately, without
feedback.
Conscious perception
The ability to identify or remember a stimulus is commonly taken
to mean that the viewer was conscious of the stimulus, and in the
work discussed here I make the assumption that consciousness is
shown by the ability to report on the stimulus by responding to a
target picture or by recognizing its title or the picture itself, in a
memory test. (See, however, evidence for unconscious effects, in
Feedforward Processing and Masked Priming.) There is a debate
about whether a single forward pass is sufﬁcient for conscious
perception. A reentrant process providing feedback may be neces-
sary to achieve understanding and conscious awareness (Lamme
andRoelfsema, 2000;Dehaene andNaccache, 2001;Hochstein and
Ahissar, 2002). As mentioned earlier, it has been suggested that a
threshold duration of about 50 ms must be exceeded if a backward
mask is presented or the stimuluswill not be consciously perceived:
consciousness of a stimulus may require sufﬁcient time “to estab-
lish sustained activity in recurrent cortical loops” (Del Cul et al.,
2007) or to ignite a network required for conscious perception
(Deheane et al., 1998). These authors thus hypothesize that view-
ers cannot become conscious of a stimulus on the basis of a single
feedforward sweep, without time for any feedback. Detection in
RSVP at durations of 50 ms/picture or less should be impossible if
there is such a threshold, because there is too little time to establish
a long-range cortical loop before a picture has been overwritten
by subsequent pictures. As reviewed in the next section, however,
there is evidence that perception is sometimes possible with very
brief, masked stimuli, a result that suggests that feedforward pro-
cessing may be sufﬁcient for conscious perception under some
conditions.
EVIDENCE FOR PROCESSING OF VERY BRIEF STIMULI
RSVP responses: monkey neurons and humans
Recordings of individual neurons in the cortex of the anterior
superior temporal sulcus (STSa) of monkeys who viewed a set
of pictures of monkey faces and other objects via RSVP at var-
ious rates up to 72/s (14 ms) showed that neurons respond to
a preferred picture above chance, even at 14 ms (Keysers et al.,
2001, 2005). In a detection study with human observers using
the same set of pictures, but presenting them in seven-picture
RSVP sequences, the participants were shown a target picture
before each sequence. They detected the target above chance at
14 ms/picture, although detection improved as the duration per
picture was increased. In another condition in the same study,
recognition of a target picture was tested immediately after the
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sequence, instead of being shown before the sequence. Partici-
pants were still above chance at 14 ms/picture, but performance
was not as good as when they saw the target picture in advance. A
possible problem with the human study is that the pictures were
repeated across trials and hence became familiar,whichmight have
allowed participants to focus on simple features in order to spot
the target.
Further evidence: detection and immediate memory
A study by Potter, Wyble, and McCourt (in preparation) repli-
cated some of the behavioral conditions of Keysers et al. (2001),
but crucially, instead of showing the picture target, they gave only
a descriptive name for the target (e.g., smiling couple), before
or immediately after an RSVP sequence of six pictured scenes.
Moreover, each picture was presented only once, and none of the
pictures were familiar to the participants. Thus, participants had
only a conceptual representation of the target they were to detect.
The RSVP sequence was presented at durations between 13 and
80 ms. Even at a presentation duration of 13 ms, the targets were
detected or recognized above chance: that is, the probability of a
correct detection on target-present trials was signiﬁcantly higher
than the probability of a false detection response on target-absent
trials. In addition, at the end of each trial participants were shown
two pictures, both matching the target name, and asked to indi-
cate which one they had seen. If they had correctly detected the
target they were more likely to pick the right picture than if they
had failed to detect it. Thus, viewers could detect and retain at
least brieﬂy information about named targets they had never seen
before, at an RSVP duration as short as 13 ms.
These results are consistent with the claim of the feedforward
model that pictures can be understood in a single feedforward
sweep even when attention has not been directed to a speciﬁc
category in advance.
How long does recognition memory last, after a very brief
presentation?
Studies of the monkey visual system using single-cell recordings
show that cortical neurons that are selective for particular objects
can “recognize” multiple objects in parallel at levels as high as the
inferior temporal cortex. Something similar in human perception
might account for the ability to remember rapidly presented pic-
tures. In monkeys, this initial parallel process is followed within
150 ms by competitive inhibition of all but the one relevant object
in a given receptive ﬁeld, at least when there is a task that deﬁnes
the relevant stimulus (e.g., Chelazzi et al., 1998; see Rousselet et al.,
2004b, for a review). The large and overlapping receptive ﬁelds
found in the inferior temporal cortex may allow for temporary
representation in parallel of several successive pictures presented
at a high rate, followed by competitive suppression that favors the
most salient picture. That could account for the capacity to detect
a target by name immediately after the presentation of six pic-
tures. If high-level representations of several of the pictures in the
sequence were activated, however, it is likely that mutual compe-
tition would soon decrease their activation. In the experiments
with RSVP described above (Potter et al., in preparation), a delay
of 5 s in naming the target picture after the sequence did decrease
accuracy.
FEEDFORWARD PROCESSING AND MASKED PRIMING
In masked priming studies, a brief presentation of a word becomes
invisible when it is followed by a second unmasked word to which
the participant must respond (Forster and Davis, 1984; Dehaene
and Naccache, 2001). The unreportable prime word still has an
effect on the following word, showing that it must have been
unconsciously identiﬁed. Indeed, the term “priming” implies a
process that beneﬁts a later stimulus in the absence of memory for
the initial stimulus, the prime. Given that the prime may have been
presented for 50 ms or more in typical masked priming experi-
ments (above the threshold for perception with a noise mask),
why is the participant not conscious of the prime? In such studies
the focus of attention is on the second stimulus, and its longer
duration permits it to receive full, recurrent processing that may
interfere with retention of the more vulnerable information from
the prime that was extracted during the feedforward sweep.When,
as in Potter et al. (in preparation), themasking stimulus is the same
duration as the preceding target stimulus and is another picture
that is to be attended, a duration of 13 ms is clearly sufﬁcient, on
a signiﬁcant proportion of trials, to drive detection, identiﬁcation,
and (at least brieﬂy) recognition memory for the pictures preced-
ing the ﬁnal picture.Whether the phenomenonof masked priming
has the same neural basis as the reportable detection observedwith
RSVP tasks such as those of Keysers et al. (2001, 2005) and Potter
et al. (in preparation) remains to be determined.
DISCUSSION: ULTRA-RAPID PROCESSING AND FEEDFORWARD
PROCESSING
Both the results of Keysers et al. (2001,2005)withmonkey neurons
and with humans, as well as the results of Potter et al. (in prepara-
tion) with humans, show that pictures can be detected and brieﬂy
remembered when presented in a short sequence as rapid as 72 or
75 pictures/s. Even when no target is speciﬁed in advance, a name
presented immediately after the sequence can prompt memory
for the corresponding picture. These results support a feedfor-
ward model that can extract a picture’s conceptual meaning in a
single forward sweep of information with an input of only 13 or
14 ms, even when the picture is preceded and followed by other
pictures.
But are there other explanations for successful detection when
the presentation duration is brief and masked by successive pic-
tures? One possibility is that at high rates of presentation several
temporally adjacent pictures are integrated, like double ormultiple
camera exposures. Certainly the subjective impression in viewing
rapid sequences is that the pictures merge into each other visually,
as though they were overlaid. Possibly viewers simply recover the
target from such a composite representation, rather than detecting
it during the feedforward pass.
A related possibility is that following masks do not interrupt
processing immediately. As mentioned in Section “Single Masked
Stimuli,” the neural basis for masking is not well-understood.
There is evidence (Keysers et al., 2001, 2005) that neurons acti-
vated in higher visual areas may continue to be active for about
60 ms longer than the SOA between stimuli in an RSVP sequence,
although the neuron would have maintained activity much longer
(e.g., for 350 ms) without a following stimulus. That is, a follow-
ing stimulus does eventually suppress activity, but only after about
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60 ms of overlap. If the time course of activity in STSa neurons
in monkeys is representative of the activity in the temporal cor-
tex underlying human performance, then there would be about
73 ms of activity produced by each picture in an RSVP sequence
at 13 ms/picture, possibly allowing time for feedback between lev-
els. However, because as many as ﬁve different pictures would be
active at the same time (at 13 ms/picture), it is not evident that
all could be receiving feedback. That, of course, might account for
the decrease in the probability of a correct detection as the rate of
presentation increases.
Nonetheless, the feedforward hypothesis remains a strong con-
tender as an explanation of picture identiﬁcation with very brief
presentation durations. In the absence of a speciﬁc model for
how feedback might assist reportable detection of brief targets,
the feedforward hypothesis seems the most plausible account.
HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE TO UNDERSTAND A PICTURED
SCENE?
Returning to the question considered in the introduction, what
can be concluded about the time required to identify a scene? If
the question is the minimum exposure duration (prior to a mask)
that is required, 13 or 14 ms is sometimes enough, when the mask
is another scene. But if the question is the time from arrival at the
retina to correct categorization, then the most reliable measures
available at present are reaction time measures, the most sensi-
tive of which is an eye movement to the appropriate target in a
choice situation. For detection of a face (when a picture with a
face is presented together with another picture), that time can be
as short as 100 ms, with a mean time of 140 ms (Crouzet et al.,
2010); detection of a vehicle takes somewhat longer.
Detection of a pre-speciﬁed target is likely to be more rapid
than comprehension of a new scene that the viewer is told nothing
about. That is one reason that recognition memory for a picture,
even immediately after a short RSVP sequence, is less accurate than
detection (Keysers et al., 2001), but another reason is that forget-
ting begins very quickly after presentation (Potter et al., 2002). As
reviewed in Section “Rapid Serial Visual Presentation,” momen-
tary comprehension is no guarantee of subsequent memory, even
seconds later. We comprehend rapidly, but then we forget selec-
tively, on the basis of what is relevant to our current goals and
needs.
As reviewed above, the speed of detection has suggested to a
number of investigators that accurate comprehension or catego-
rization can occur on the basis of the early feedforward sweep of
visual information, without requiring feedback loops from higher
to lower levels and back. The behavior of individual neurons in the
human inferior temporal cortex and homologous areas in monkey
cortex, reviewed elsewhere in this issue, provides another window
on the timing of picture categorization that gives some support to
the feedforward hypothesis. When a scene is complex or its com-
ponents are unfamiliar, we undoubtedly require more processing
time and probably more than a single ﬁxation to comprehend it.
However, a lifetime of knowledge of the world that is built into our
visual system appears to allow immediate understanding of most
scenes, based on the initial sweep of visual information when the
scene is presented.
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